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In the centuries-long cultural project of humanity’s growing awareness of its 
place in the universe, evaluating the extent of human rationality represents a 
seminal project. Keith E. Stanovich, The Robot’s Rebellion, 2005, 92.
A cursory glance at the list of Nobel laureates for economics is suffi-
cient to confirm Stanovich’s description of the project to evaluate human 
rationality as seminal. Herbert Simon, Reinhard Selten, John Nash, Daniel 
Kahneman, and others were awarded their prizes less for their work in 
economics, per se, than for their work on rationality as such. Although 
philosophical works have for millennia attempted to describe, explicate, 
and evaluate individual and collective aspects of rationality, new impetus 
was brought to this endeavor over the last century as mathematical logic 
along with the social and behavioral sciences emerged. Yet more recently, 
over the last several decades, propelled by the emergence of artificial in-
telligence, cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, neuropsychology, 
and related fields, even more sophisticated approaches to the study of ra-
tionality have emerged.
Some among these new lines of inquiry, including those pursued by 
Kahneman (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972), have been interpreted as imply-
ing that humans are not quite the rational creatures that Aristotle imag-
ined us to be (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1994). Indeed, it does seem to be the 
case that our performance in rational choice experiments is suboptimal, 
falling short of expected utility or Bayesian prescriptions; sometimes even 
experts—medical, legal, or engineering—perform at surprisingly and 
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alarmingly poor levels on tests directly relevant to their areas of expertise 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 2000; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Kahneman, Slovic, & 
Tversky, 1982). To cite just one example, trained physicians regularly and 
unnecessarily scare the bejeebers out of patients by committing the base 
rate fallacy: that is, they exaggerate the significance of positive results in 
diagnostic tests for relatively rare medical conditions (Hamm, 1996). But 
what these suboptimal performances imply about the nature of rationality 
more generally is contentious, having triggered what is in some quarters 
referred to as the “rationality wars”(Samuels, Stich, & Bishop, 2002).
It might seem that waging academic “war” over scientific findings, even 
if they do have important implications for how we should regard the con-
sultations of experts, is excessive. But more is at stake than assessment of 
expertise. Since the assumption that humans are rational is pivotal to our 
understanding of the type of creature that we are, any significant challenge 
to that assumption might be felt demoralizing, not unlike the realizations 
that our species and solar system are products of evolution. Implications 
of these findings are, potentially, sweeping. One worry is that rationality 
has been thought by some to be a precondition for many of the capacities 
that humans exhibit (Davidson, 1984). A second, perhaps more troubling, 
worry is that if it is the case that we fall very far short of Aristotle’s notion 
of rationality, such a finding might necessitate a dark reassessment of the 
human capacity for moral responsibility (Dahan-Katz, 2013). There was a 
time when concerns about moral responsibility were motivated more by 
the place of humans in the causal structure of the world. Recently, how-
ever, the focus of much attention has shifted to rationality and the psycho-
logical capacities that constitute its foundation (Morse, 2007), those very 
capacities that have been called into question. So getting clear about how 
to interpret the relevant scientific findings is no small thing.
We should be clear, however, about what is not contentious: substan-
tial deviations from subjectively expected utility and Bayesian models 
are commonplace (Stanovich, 2010). We are not as responsive to reason 
when choosing beliefs or actions as may once have been thought, or at 
least hoped. At the personal, conscious level, we are not proficient im-
plementers of Bayesian inference, even though it seems our brains (the 
subpersonal, nonconscious level) often act like a Bayesian mechanism 
(Hohwy, 2013). That we are susceptible to personal-level, systematic cog-
nitive bias is no longer subject to dispute. There are limits or “bounds” 
to human rationality: in the context of decision-making, individual or 
organizational, what might be optimal is not necessarily what should 
be expected, for there are always constraints on information-processing 
capabilities (Simon, 1972, 1983). This is an instance wherein the ought-
implies-can principle must be invoked: how we should reason is neces-
sarily constrained by the capabilities of brains and their environments, 
no matter whether the brains are artificial, nonhuman, human, healthy or 
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unhealthy, and irrespective of whether we are practicing science or reflect-
ing on the seeming irrationality of recondite philosophical texts.
Many among these constraints are temporal, constraints that are most 
tellingly evident when agents must decide whether or how to act (practical 
rationality), since such decisions are made in real time. Indeed, even poly-
nomial time greatly constrains the capacity for evaluating belief, despite 
the fact that within complexity theory polynomial expressions are relative-
ly easy (Ladner, 1975). Other constraints involve the dynamic adjustment 
of our aspirations to features of unfolding context; decision alternatives 
for what to believe or how to act are not fixed or predetermined, in the 
way that seems to have been implied by the von Neumann–Morgenstein 
utility theorem or other similar normative models that characterize hu-
man beings as utility maximizers (von Neuman & Morgenstern, 1944). 
Instead, our aspirations are discovered in the process of searching. These, 
then, are adjusted upward or down, in a manner befitting the context of 
discovery (Selten, 2001).
Obviously, search cannot be unbounded, at least not literally. Norma-
tive models like that proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern posit 
exhaustive coverage of alternatives, but neither mere mortals nor mere 
machines can conduct exhaustive searches, especially when it is not 
even clear just what might count as an alternative. Toward this end, to 
prune the tree of possibilities and reduce the burdens of evaluating each, 
we rely heavily upon rules of thumb or heuristic strategies (Gigerenzer 
& Goldstein, 1996). Often too, the framing of a problem (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981), conversational context (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982, 
pp. 132–135), and emotion (Damasio, 1999) efficiently, though not neces-
sarily reliably, reduce search space.
Even if there is consensus on goals and their evaluation, search is not 
made significantly less difficult. In other words, even if we presuppose 
that the utilities of goals have been antecedently fixed, the problems con-
fronted by mortals and machines do not disappear (Hempel, 1965, pp. 
463–472). Deciding how to act, for example, will vary among persons, re-
flecting different inductive attitudes or degrees of optimism. Mathemati-
cal models of decision-making under uncertainty, like the “maximin” and 
“maximax” rules, reflect these differences. The former represents extreme 
caution, in that the maxim for action is “assume the worst possible out-
come”; the latter, optimism, in that the maxim for action is expect “the best 
possible outcome.”
Simon (1996, pp. 27–30, 119–121) neatly encapsulates many of these 
ideas with the felicitous, if not altogether aesthetically pleasing, term “sat-
isfice.” Rather than optimizing or maximizing, humans tend to satisfice, 
that is, we tend to choose between better or worse. Choosing that which 
is best is usually not an option because we rarely have a method of find-
ing the optimum. Bound by practical computational limits, we cannot 
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generate the entire list of possible alternatives nor fully evaluate the mer-
its of those we do manage to generate. These difficulties are compounded 
by the fact that even were we to stumble upon the best alternative early 
in the search process, we could not recognize it as the best until after we 
had generated the entire list. So we satisfice; we conduct moderate, not 
exhaustive, searches until we find something acceptable, not optimal.
Naturally enough, however, the capacity to search effectively varies 
greatly. We differ in temperament and talent, as well as in the particular 
enculturation practices to which we are exposed. These differences matter 
although in certain important respects, we all must settle for satisficing, 
people exhibit better or worse capabilities for thinking up new and fruitful 
possibilities. Like Selten and Simon, Nozick (1993, pp. 172–181) observes 
that not restricting our search for alternatives to a preexisting set can be a 
good strategy. Even an inferior choice from among a newly generated list 
might be better than the best choice from a preexisting list. That which 
Nozick dubs “rationality’s imagination” is important because lacking 
imagination our searches would not only fail to be exhaustive, they would 
be myopic. Not all who try to imagine new alternatives will succeed; more 
than likely a majority will fail. But rationality is as much social as it is indi-
vidual (Weber, 1978; Lazarsfeld & Oberschall, 1965; Clark, 2001), and one 
important implication of this fact is that the costs of individual failure do 
not necessarily affect the group. On the other hand, successes achieved by 
individuals can have positive effects for the group. Thus society’s capac-
ity for insulating the group from individual failure contributes directly to 
promotion of rationality’s more exploratory and risk-incurring features.
It should be acknowledged that von Neuman–Morgenstein utility and 
similar models have a well-deserved workhorse status, especially within 
modern economics (Karni, 2014). Nevertheless, it is clear that one among 
their limitations is the requirement “to abstract away aspects in the con-
textual environment” (Stanovich, 2005, p. 247). But the constraints that 
result in our suboptimal, satisficing performance make it abundantly clear 
that context does matter. Botterill & Carruthers (1999, p. 107) describe the 
implications of recent empirical and conceptual research thus: “… stan-
dards of rationality for belief-forming processes should be relativized to 
our needs as situated, finite, enquirers after truth.” Indeed, a principal 
goal of this volume is to promote and assist with the task of relativizing 
the belief-forming processes indicative of rationality to context, features of 
the environment that utility maximizing models disregard.
It might be objected that enquiring “after truth,” sets a goal no less im-
practical, or conceptually misguided, than exhaustively searching among 
a tree of possible alternatives. But even scholars who are wary of setting 
off in search of truth, like Thomas Kuhn, invoke “rationality” and tout 
the virtues of rational theory choice (Kuhn, 2000a). Kuhn is dubious about 
existing theories of rationality (Kuhn, 2000b, p. 159), viewing them as in 
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need of “readjustment.” But he takes explaining the success of science 
with respect to enhanced efficiency in puzzle solving as a possible starting 
point for developing new theories of rationality. A principal reason for the 
organization of this volume is the editors’ belief that even if we assume 
that puzzle solving, or some similar version of “temperate” rationality 
(Newton-Smith, 1981, pp. 266–273), is a proper platform upon which to 
begin the task of “readjusting” theories of rationality, puzzle solving itself 
would still need to be embedded in constraint-sensitive contexts.
Of course Kuhn’s discussions of rationality are confined to the context 
of scientific practice. Given the premise that belief-forming processes need 
to be contextualized, perhaps it would be better to abandon the project of 
investigating rationality, in general, and replace it by approaches distinc-
tive of individual disciplines. But to take such a step would be imprudent 
because even though in many discussions of rationality the normative-
descriptive distinction is not sharply drawn (Richardson, 1998, p. 567), 
there is no basis for treating “rationality” as a purely descriptive, natural 
kind term like, say, “fire,” which underwent radical reclassification after 
the discovery that burning wood, rusting iron, and biological metabolism 
all involve oxidation, whereas the sun, lightning, northern lights, and fire-
flies do not (Churchland, 2002, pp. 129–131). There is no reason to antici-
pate discovery of an analogue to oxidation; ipso facto, there is no reason 
to expect that a similar compartmentalized reduction of “rationality” is in 
the offing.
But warning that investigations of “rationality” should not be segre-
gated is grounded in more than an intuition that its conceptual status 
is unlike “fire.” Although “rationality” remains somewhat diffuse, we 
have good reason to believe that it is a disposition shared by all cogni-
tive agents, an important factor in marking the distinction between, say, 
rendering judgments and being lost in reverie (Byron, 2004). To say that 
rationality plays more of a role in the former than it does in the latter is 
to say something substantial. To a first approximation, it is that in virtue 
of which agents adopt or act upon beliefs, appropriately. Despite the ob-
vious imprecision of this definition, it seems to identify a perfectly gen-
eral capacity for forming true beliefs and performing successful actions, a 
capacity that transcends the presuppositions of any particular context or 
community, a capacity that is applicable to individuals or groups, to politi-
cal economists or scientists, to peoples of all sociohistorical contexts, per-
haps even to nonhumans (Trigg, 1993, p. 62). What is more, it is that which 
is lost or diminished when agents suffer from certain pathological condi-
tions; in fact, it is often a symptom of those conditions (Bortolotti, 2010).
This general capacity seems to be what Quine (1976, p. 233) is referring 
to when he writes “science is itself a continuation of common sense. The 
scientist is indistinguishable from the common man in his sense of evi-
dence, except that the scientist is more careful.” Scientists are dependent 
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upon a “primitive sense of evidence,” that they use “carefully and system-
atically.” Both the common man and the scientist are agents who adopt 
or act upon beliefs, appropriately, albeit while exhibiting contextually 
shaped standards for what counts as appropriate. The “primitive sense 
of evidence” is a reflection of our capacity for rationality; “care and sys-
tem” are what enable us to overcome—in a manner that is relativized to 
context—the many cognitive biases that have recently been described. It is 
that same care and system that make possible a bootstrapping of ourselves 
from common sense rationality to scientific rationality.
Quine (1976, p. 234) proceeds to observe that even the very preference 
for simplicity “is a lay habit carried over by science.” He adds that the 
simpler of two hypotheses is generally regarded “not only as the more 
desirable but also as the more probable” (1976, p. 255). The latter point, 
concerning the greater probability of a simpler hypothesis being true, 
appears to be a point at which Simon and Quine converge, satisfice and 
simplify find common ground. In Simon’s terms, we satisfice rather than 
optimize, but seem none too much the worse for having done so. Perhaps 
our bounded rationality is of a piece with our preference for simplicity, 
and it is a reliable guide to navigating this uncertain world because we 
have developed sufficiently simple and successful strategies. These strate-
gies are foundational, part of the common core that makes an interdisci-
plinary approach to rationality so apt.
Nevertheless, there is no denying that the attempt to understand ratio-
nality in a way that is not bound to any one domain or tradition is par-
tially influenced by philosophy’s predilection for an expansive approach 
to scholarship. In the words of Sellars (1962, p. 1), philosophy aims “to 
understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang 
together in the broadest possible sense of the term.” Although many of 
the essays collected here are animated by empirical work, this is primarily 
a philosophical work, one that aims to contribute to understanding how 
scientific, pathological, nonhuman, pedestrian, and other forms of ratio-
nality, even serious meditations on irrationality, “hang together.”
To place this volume in historical context, it is an attempt to help 
make sense of an entire, millennia-long enterprise that has undergone 
an abrupt, somewhat rude awakening in recent decades. To a consider-
able extent, economists and philosophers have aligned with one anoth-
er in a tug-of-war with psychologists over “rationality.” Much but not 
all of the tension is more apparent than real because philosophers and 
economists have tended to emphasize theoretical and normative aspects 
(Rescher, 1988), while psychologists have tended to emphasize its prac-
tical and descriptive aspects (Kahneman, 2011). Nevertheless, it would 
be foolish to disregard the impact of recent psychological studies; after 
all, their having garnered a lion’s share of Nobel Prizes for economics 
is not without warrant. But the evident influence of those studies does 
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not justify wholesale refutation of positions adopted by a generation of 
economists and philosophers.
The proper response to conflicts over “rationality” is, instead, to call 
in a plumber. Midgley (2001, p. 37) opines that “when the conflicts get so 
bad that we do notice them, we need to call in a philosophic plumber.” 
The rationality wars were, in their more heated, overwrought moments, 
just that bad. In those moments, amid the handwringing over potentially 
“bleak implications for human rationality” (Nisbett & Borgida, 1975), a 
niche was created, a need for philosophers to plumb. Now that much of 
the dust has settled, toward what ends should the philosophic plumbers 
direct their efforts?
Acknowledging that belief-forming processes are constrained does not 
imply that constraints cannot be satisfied locally, or in a manner that is 
relativized to specific contexts (Glymour, 1992, pp. 361–363). We can apply 
what has been learned in recent decades to specific contexts, searching for, 
plumbing, perhaps even correcting some erroneous beliefs and errors in 
belief formation. Both in spite of and because of our bounded rationality 
this is doable. Since search space is restricted we know where to look, and 
because of subjective expected utility and Bayesian models, as well as, our 
familiarity with cognitive bias, we know what to look for.
Although the focus of this volume is on rationality as it is realized, or 
fails to be realized, in specific contexts, we do as well keep an eye on how 
distinct pockets of localized rationality “hang together,” reflecting ratio-
nality “in the broadest possible sense of the term.” After all, global con-
siderations are often called upon to override local; what is best or better 
provincially and provisionally might not be abiding or perdurable in the 
broader scheme of things. Central banks and citizens might believe print-
ing money a good way to revive depressed economies, until inflation sets 
in, negating the benefits of having more currency in circulation and trig-
gering fears among neighbors of sovereign default.
Even apparent pathologies of rationality can be informative as regards 
how to comprehend rationality in the broad sense of the term. It is of-
ten the case that when normal functions are damaged the nature of re-
maining capabilities can be seen with greater clarity (Frith, 1998). To cite 
just two examples, investigations of delusion can help us to better assess 
epistemic goodness (Bortolotti, 2015) and investigations of depression can 
help us to better understand the nature of belief (Lane & Flanagan, 2015). 
Similarly, investigations of rationality in nonhuman animals can assist 
with the drawing of important distinctions among types of rationality 
(Bermudez, 2003), while investigations of artificial intelligence can assist 
with understanding how knowledge relevance is or should be determined 
(Ford and Pylyshyn, 1996).
Of course in this broader sense we can only strive to approximate ra-
tionality, and the effort devoted to this task is carried out in the dark, so 
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to speak, since there is no mature consensus theory of approximation. A 
time-honored alternative to approximation of the ideal is avoidance of er-
ror, a view associated with Pearce’s “self-correcting thesis” (Mayo, 2005), 
a thesis no less problematic than the attempt to approximate rationality’s 
ideal. Nevertheless, human success at having bootstrapped ourselves from 
common sense to science shows that taking concepts like “approximation 
of rationality” and “avoidance of irrationality” as rough-and-ready goals 
can drive progress.
But how does progress occur when the goal is inexact? Consider that 
every schoolboy learns to identify “north” in a rough-and-ready way by 
facing the sun before noontime and extending his left arm to the left side; 
a slightly more sophisticated technique, provided one is in the Northern 
Hemisphere, is to identify Polaris at Ursa Minor’s handle tip. But neither 
of these will indicate true or geodesic north with precision; for that, sur-
veying techniques are required. Complicating matters even more, geode-
sic north is distinct from magnetic north, the direction pointed to by a 
compass. And there are yet more distinct meanings of “north.” Neverthe-
less, people have been finding their way north, approximately, for millen-
nia, with methods that any child can learn.
Approximating rationality is like heading north. Human beings had 
probably been tilting toward rationality since the Pleistocene, long before 
Aristotle’s theory of the syllogism, a seminal development that led to cen-
turies of advances in rational thought, including the mathematical logic 
of Frege and Russell. During the last half century the pace of progress has 
accelerated, albeit in a way that was unanticipated. The very idea that we 
are rational has been challenged by findings from cognitive science, psy-
chology, and related disciplines. Flashpoints have been many: base rate 
neglect, availability cascade, conjunction fallacy, belief perseverance, and 
so on. A modest conclusion that can be derived from these experimental 
findings about how humans reason is that we need a context-sensitive, 
carefully nuanced reassessment of rationality; a radical conclusion, as folk 
and scientific or scholarly models of rationality are deeply confused. This 
volume takes the former, not the latter, as its premise. Humans are pre-
dictably “irrational” at times, when dealing with some kinds of problems, 
when impaired, and when in certain contexts. But by attending closely to 
those varied contexts, and informed by a half century of scientific studies 
and philosophical efforts to achieve reflective equilibrium, the study of 
rationality can be rejuvenated, even applied to sober attempts at assessing 
irrationality.
Rationality cannot be approached asymptotically, not literally that is. 
Nevertheless, we can make more satisfactory our precisifications of “ra-
tionality” or its approximation. By aiming in its general direction, through 
analyses of some diverse contexts in which it is realized, while attending 
to various ways in which it is modulated, the project of understanding 
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rationality can forge ahead. In this volume we concentrate on diverse 
but not discrete contexts: scientific, communicative, pathological, nonhu-
man, ostensible irrationality in Chinese philosophy, and the modulation 
of reason by emotion. This scope and variety is well suited to this early 
postrationality wars era. An important step in reassessing “rationality” 
is to situate it in variegated contexts, so to better understand how belief-
forming processes are relativized and constrained. Future models of ratio-
nality, whether descriptive or normative, will need to be grounded in just 
such an expansive foundation, if they are to further advance this seminal 
project.
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